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COPYRIGHT AND COMPUTER PROGRAMS: A FAILED
EXPERIMENT AND A SOLUTION TO A DILEMMA
WILLIAM F. PATRY
INTRODUCTION
Efforts to ensure that investment is protected can lead to distor-
tions in the law if the nature of the protection granted is inappropriate
to the body of law in which protection is placed.  Sometimes there is
no appropriate existing body of law, and in such a circumstance sui
generis protection is the best solution.  This happened in 1984, when
Congress extended protection to the layout design of semiconductor
chips.  Resisting efforts by the Senate to shoehorn chip protection into
the Copyright Act, the House insisted, and the Senate ultimately ac-
ceded to, sui generis legislation.
The organic copyright act was not so fortunate in the case of com-
puter programs.  Using dubious analogies to literary works, the deci-
sion was made early on in the revision process that led to the 1976 Act
to simply declare computer programs to be a form of literary work.  A
definition of computer programs, added in 1980, makes the ill-fit ex-
press:  “[A] set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indi-
rectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.”1  The
requirement that the work “bring about a certain result” is unparal-
leled in copyright law and inconsistent with basic principles embodied
in §102(b) against protecting methods of operation and processes.
Given these inherent contradictions, it is not surprising that courts
have struggled without a great deal of success to reconcile the irrecon-
cilable. We shall first review how the fateful decision was made.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES UNDER THE 1909 ACT
While ordinarily “books” contain compositions of words, they may
also consist of tables of data.  It was against this background that the
Copyright Office decided, on May 19, 1964, to register computer pro-
grams as “books” under its rule of doubt.2  The Office’s decision was
1. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1980).
2. Cary, Copyright Registration and Computer Programs, 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
362 (1964); COPYRIGHT OFFICE CIRCULAR NO. 61 (1964), reproduced in 11 BULL. COPY-
RIGHT SOC’Y 361 (1964).
201
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the result of an application submitted on November 30, 1961, by North
American Aviation, Inc., for a computer program (SCOPAC-PROG.63)
embodied in magnetic tape.  Subsequently, on April 20, 1964, a very
brief computer program created by a student at Columbia University
Law School was published in the Columbia Law Review Notes.  Registra-
tion for this program was made in May 1964. Registration for the
North American Aviation program was made in June 1964.3
While the Copyright Office had doubts about whether computer
programs could be considered the “writings of an author” under the
Constitution, and whether a machine-readable version of a program
qualified as a “copy” under the 1909 Act,4 based on the “rule of doubt”
– an Office-created policy that resolves doubtful cases in favor of the
applicant – the Office announced it would consider registration of a
computer program as a “book” if:
(1) The elements of assembling, selecting, arranging, ed-
iting, and literary expression that went into the compila-
tion of the computer program [were] sufficient to
constitute original authorship.
(2) The program [was] published with the required copy-
right notice; that is, “copies” (i.e., reproductions of the
program in a form perceptible to the human eye) bearing
the notice [were] distributed or made available to the
public.5
(3) The copies deposited for registration consist of or in-
clude reproductions in a language intelligible to human
beings.  If the only publication was in a form that could
not be perceived visually or read, something more (e.g., a
print-out of the entire program) would also have to be
deposited.6
The Copyright Office defined a computer program as “ei-
ther a set of operating instructions for a computer or a
compilation of reference information to be drawn upon
by the computer in solving problems.”  Registration was
3. Cary, supra note 2, at 363 (1964).
4. COPYRIGHT OFFICE CIRCULAR NO. 61 (1964), reproduced in 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y 361 (1964).
5. See Supplementary Practice No. 35:  Position of the Copyright Notice on Computer Pro-
grams of Domestic Origin First Published in the Form of Machine Readable Tape or Machine
Punched Cards, COMPENDIUM I OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES at S-125 (1973 ed.).
6. COPYRIGHT OFFICE CIRCULAR NO. 61 (1964), reproduced in 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y 361 (1964).
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believed appropriate since “substantial elements of gath-
ering, choosing, rejecting, editing, and arranging mate-
rial” were involved in the creation of programs.7
The limitation of protection to published programs (dictated by
Section 10 of the 1909 Act), the state of development in the computer
industry (essentially large mainframe computers), and the fear of dis-
closing trade secrets by deposit with the Copyright Office limited the
number of programs registered.  From May 1964 to January 1, 1978
(the general effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act), approximately
2,000 programs were registered.8  The Copyright Office’s practices
were never challenged in court, and only a few decisions can be read as
inferentially touching on the copyrightability of computer programs
under the 1909 Act.9
THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT
The 1976 Copyright Act did not separately list computer programs
as a category of unprotected work.  The Judiciary Committee reports
that accompany the Act explain the reason for this lack of statutory
reference:
The history of copyright law has been one of gradual ex-
pansion in the types of works accorded protection. . . .
[S]cientific discoveries and technological developments
have made possible new forms of creative expression that
never existed before.  In some of these cases the new ex-
pressive forms—electronic music, filmstrips, and com-
7. Id.
8. FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS 15 (1979).  Since passage of the 1976 Act and the Copyright Of-
fice’s institution of deposit practices preserving confidential information, the number
of computer programs registered has increased dramatically.  In the first two years
under the 1976 Act, almost as many machine-readable works (a category that includes
electronic data bases) were registered as had been registered in the period 1964-1978.
9. Data Cash Sys. Inc. v. JS&A Group, 628 F.2d 1038, 1041-42 (7th Cir. 1980)
(computer chess program; work held to be in the public domain for failure to affix
required notice); Synercom Tech., Inc. v. Univ. Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003
(N.D. Tex. 1979) (input formats); Telex Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 367 F. Supp.
258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev’d in part (on antitrust issue), aff’d in part (on counterclaim),
510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975) (computer program manuals).  See also Harcourt, Brace &
World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (Copyright
Office practice noted in nonprogram case); Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Co., 710 F.
Supp. 1297 (D. Or. 1987) (claim in computer program created before January 1, 1978
dismissed).
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puter programs, for example—could be regarded as an
extension of copyrightable subject matter Congress had
already intended to protect, and were thus considered
copyrightable from the outset without the need of new
legislation.10
Computer programs are thus regarded as one form of “literary
works,” and the definition of “literary work” in Section 101 of the Act
was obviously drafted with computer programs in mind:
“Literary works” are works, other than audiovisual works,
expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numeri-
cal symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the ma-
terial objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts,
phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they
are embodied.11
The only decision under the unamended 1976 Act followed this
legislative statement, finding computer programs, as a class, pro-
tectible as “literary works.”12  Although computer programs are utilita-
rian works in the colloquial sense of being functional, they are not
“useful articles” within the meaning of the Copyright Act, see 17 U.S.C.
§101 (1978) (definition of “useful article”), since they convey informa-
tion and are not pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works.13  Nevertheless,
it is precisely the functional nature of computer programs that has
caused the greatest difficulties in determining the scope of protection
for and infringement of computer programs.
10. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 50 (1975).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1978). See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 54 (1976) (“The term
‘literary works’ . . . includes computer data bases, and computer programs to the extent
that they incorporate authorship in the programmer’s expression of original ideas, as
distinguished from the ideas themselves’’); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 52 (1975) (literary
works may be embodied in computer punch cards). But see DRAFT SECOND SUPPLEMEN-
TARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF U.S. COPY-
RIGHT LAW, ch. I, at 4 (1975) (definition ”seems limited when it comes to computer
programs’’).
12. Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, 524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal.
1981). But cf. Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1066 n.4
(N.D. Ill. 1979) (dictum), aff’d on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
13. Compare E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1498 (D. Minn.
1985), with Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 52-53 (D.
Mass. 1990), rev’d, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S.
233 (1996) and W & Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Labs., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir.
1986).  Both Lotus and Whelan erroneously used the term “utilitarian work’’ in its collo-
quial sense.
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THE 1980 SOFTWARE AMENDMENTS
In 1980, amendments concerning software were included in H.R.
6934, a patent revision bill.  Brief testimony on the copyright parts of
the bill was given before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Lib-
erties and the Administration of Justice on April 15, 1980,14 and on
May 8, 1980.15  On December 12, 1980, President Carter signed the bill
into law.16  The legislation contained the following definition of “com-
puter program”:
A “computer program” is a set of statements or instruc-
tions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in
order to bring about a certain result.17
This definition is remarkable in at least two respects:  first, protec-
tion is granted to a set of statements or instructions, thereby focusing
protection on the relationship of the parts of the program to each
other; and, second, no computer program is protectible unless it may
be used (directly or indirectly) to bring about a “certain result” in a
computer.  While the first element of this definition resonated with the
existing definitions of “compilation” and “audiovisual work,” both of
which were drafted with an eye toward protection for the assemblage
of elements, the functional requirement was, and remains, unprece-
dented and moreover at least potentially in conflict with Section
102(b), which inter alia, prohibits protection for methods of operation
and processes.
Decisions after the 1980 amendments have uniformly upheld cop-
yright in computer programs as a class, regardless of their form (source
or object code), their purpose (application program or operating sys-
tem), or fixation (paper or computer chip).  With these issues out of
the way, the courts turned to the more difficult question of the scope
of copyright.  This question involves not whether a computer program
as a whole is copyrightable, but rather whether an admittedly copy-
rightable computer program has been infringed by the unauthorized
appropriation in the late 1980s, early 1990s, of portions of the pro-
gram.  Two particular issues were the focus of attention recently:  (1)
14. Industrial Innovation and Patent and Copyright Law Amendments:  Hearings on H.R.
6033 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the
House Judiciary Comm., 96th Cong., at 42-46 (1980).
15. Id. at 635-36, 683-86, 698-701.
16. Act of December 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(b), 94 Stat. 3015, 3028
(1980). See also H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, at 23-24 (1980); H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, Pt. 2, at
19 (1980).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1980).
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protection for the nonliteral elements of a program, sometimes known
as the program’s “structure, sequence, and organization,” and (2) pro-
tection for interfaces – e.g., those parts of the program that the user
sees or that communicate internally between different parts of the
computer or between the hardware and a computer program.
STRUCTURE, SEQUENCE, AND ORGANIZATION
While the language of the statutory definition of “computer pro-
gram” as a “set of statements or instructions” could be read as limiting
protection to the literal code of computer programs, there is no more
reason to limit a computer program’s protection to the literal “state-
ments or instructions” than to limit a motion picture’s protection to
the literal “series of related images” that identify the nature of the mo-
tion picture, or a novel to the literal, original language in which it was
written.  Any limitation of protection to the literal code of a computer
program is also negated by the grant of the right to prepare derivative
works in Section 106(2).  A “derivative work” is defined as encompass-
ing, in relevant part, “any . . . form in which a work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted,” including translations.18  Thus, an original
computer program enjoys the same rights – and therefore scope of
protection – as all other works, limited only by its originality.
The proper inquiry is to identify expression in the particular com-
puter program at issue.  Such determinations must be ad hoc, taking
into account the level of creativity embodied in the work.  Grand rules
are no more helpful for analysis of computer programs than they have
been for other forms of authorship, yet the novelty of the subject mat-
ter led some courts to write extraordinarily and unnecessarily long
opinions enunciating such rules.  A better approach, at least initially, is
to start with the statute.
THE PROPER APPROACH TO DETERMINING COPYRIGHTABILITY OF
COMPUTER PROGRAMS:  LOOK TO THE STATUTE
As the Supreme Court has held, “[i]n cases of statutory construc-
tion, we begin with the words of the statute,”19 which includes not only
18. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (definition of “derivative work’’), 106(3) (1978).  The first
derivative right granted was the translation right provided in 1865, in response to a
decision holding that an unauthorized German translation of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s
Uncle Tom’s Cabin was not a ”copy’’ since it did not reproduce the literal words of the
original.
19. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981).
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the language but also the structure of the statute.  The pertinent lan-
guage is found in section 102(a)’s extension of protection to “original
works of authorship” and in the section 101 definition of “computer
program.”20  The pertinent structure of the Copyright Act is the inter-
relationship between these two sections.  Section 102(a) is the source
of all protection under the Act.  Incorporating the constitutional re-
quirement of originality, the section limits protection to those works
that are independently created and possess “at least some minimal de-
gree of creativity.”21  Section 102(a) does not inform us, however, how
this threshold requirement of originality can be met for any particular
class of works.  The answer to that question is provided by the section
101 subject matter definitions,22 including the definition of “computer
program.”
The approach to be suggested here – to regard the section 101
subject matter definitions as embodying Congress’s expression of how
originality can be satisfied – originates with Judge (now Justice) Ruth
Bader Ginsburg’s opinion in Atari Games Corp. v. Oman,23 and with Jus-
tice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.24  Before this approach is spelled out, though, it is
first necessary to review Lotus, the historical treatment of computer
programs as literary works, since that treatment is in part responsible
for the false paths the courts have taken in their attempt to determine
the copyrightability of computer programs.
STEP ONE: “ORIGINAL WORKS OF AUTHORSHIP”
The copyrightability of computer programs must, of course, be
determined by the statute Congress has given us.  In that statute, Con-
gress has told us first that copyright extends to “original works of au-
thorship.”25  This term was deliberately left undefined, with Congress
stating a desire that the courts continue to apply the standard they
20. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
21. Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co, 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
22. In the case of musical works, dramatic works, pantomimes and choreographic
works, Congress did not provide a definition of the subject matter, believing these
works had fairly settled meanings. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at
52.  The fact that Congress took the trouble to provide definitions for the remaining
five categories of works because their meanings were unsettled should heighten the
attention courts pay to those definitions.
23. 888 F.2d 878, 881-82 (1989).
24. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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already had developed.26  In Feist, the Supreme Court authoritatively
delineated that standard, holding that “original, as the term is used in
copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the
author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses
at least some minimal degree of creativity . . . [a] creative spark . . . .”27
The creative spark need not create a shock, but it must at least be per-
ceptible to the touch.
The originality standard is an objective one that does not permit
the courts to use their own judgment of the aesthetic merit of the
work, nor to cut back on or deny protection because the work serves a
commercial purpose.  In place of such subjective evaluations, the only
issue is whether the requirement of originality as construed by the Feist
Court has been met.  In part, the disarray in the lower courts over com-
puter programs is the result of some judges’ antagonism to Congress’
decision to protect computer programs under the copyright law.
These judges view computer programs’ functional and commercial at-
tributes as worthy of protection, if at all, under the more rigorous re-
quirements of the patent laws.  Availability of protection under patent
law is not, however, a bar to protection under the Copyright Act, as
Congress made clear in that act.28
STEP TWO:  THE STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER DEFINITIONS
While originality is an objective concept, it is also an abstract one.
For although it informs us what the requisite general level of creativity
is, it does not give us practical guidance about how that level can be
reached in particular cases.  The answer to how originality can be satis-
fied in particular cases is found instead in the definitions of subject
matter Congress provided in section 101 of the Act.  As Feist29 and Atari
Games Corp.30  recognized, these definitions express Congress’ judg-
26. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 51; S. REP. NO. 94-473,  at 50.
27. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
28. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(d) (“Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or
remedies under any other Federal statute.”); see also U.S. Patent and Trademark Office &
U.S. Copyright Office, Patent-Copyright Laws Overlap Study x (1991) (prepared for the
House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice, and
concluding that “there appears to be minimal overlap between the subject matter of
copyrights and utility patents because the statutes make clear that the areas of protected
matter in each case are markedly different”).
29. Feist, 499 U.S. at 354-61.
30. Atari Games Corp., 888 F.2d at 881.
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ment about how, for the defined subject matter, the constitutional
standard of originality can be satisfied.
A brief review of the definition of “compilation” as construed in
Feist and the definition of “audiovisual work” as construed in Atari
Games Corp. will demonstrate the methodology.
A “compilation” is defined as:
[A] work formed by the collection and assembling of pre-
existing materials or of data that are selected, coordi-
nated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work
as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.31
The Feist Court construed the definition’s tripartite structure (as
indicated by the emphases) as indicating how originality could be satis-
fied. All three elements must be present: (1) there must be a collection
of data, (2) from which the compiler selects, coordinates, or arranges
certain data (3) in an original way. As the Court recognized,
the key to the statutory definition is the second require-
ment.  It instructs courts that  . . . they should focus on
the manner in which the collected facts have been se-
lected, coordinated, and arranged. . . .  The statute dic-
tates that the principal focus should be on whether the
selection, coordination, and arrangement are sufficiently
original to merit protection.32
“Audiovisual works” are defined as: works that consist
of a series of related images which are intrinsically in-
tended to be shown by the use of machines or devices
. . . .33
Atari Games Corp. involved the simple audiovisual electronic game
“Breakout,” in  which no individual frame was protectible.  The Copy-
right Office refused registration, ignoring the work’s original sequence
of images.  In reversing a district judge who had affirmed the Copy-
right Office’s decision, Judge (now Justice) Ruth Bader Ginsburg in-
structed the Copyright Office to focus on “the audiovisual work as a
whole, i.e., the total sequence of the images displayed as the game is
played.”34  When the Office again refused registration, Judge Ginsburg
criticized the Office for analyzing only the individual screens “rather
31. Feist, 499 U.S. at 356 (alteration in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
32. Id. at 358.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “audiovisual work”).
34. Atari Games Corp., 888 F.2d at 883.
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than the flow of the game as a whole.”35  She also cited the Supreme
Court’s intervening Feist opinion and found that Feist’s focus on the
definition of “compilation” provided an analogous methodology for
analyzing originality in audiovisual works.  Both compilations and au-
diovisual works, she wrote, “involve a choice and ordering of elements
that, in themselves, may not qualify for protection; the author’s selec-
tion and arrangement, however, may ‘entail [the] minimal degree of
creativity” needed to bring the work within the protection of the copy-
right laws.“36
The definition of “computer program” bears a striking resem-
blance to that of “audiovisual work” as construed by Judge Ginsburg in
Atari Games Corp.:
Computer Program:
A “computer program” is a set of statements or instruc-
tions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in
order to bring about a certain result.37
Audiovisual Works:
“Audiovisual works” are works that consist of a series of
related images which are intrinsically intended to be
shown by the use of machines or devices . . . .38
Both definitions direct attention to the whole rather than to the
individual components.39  Indeed, when one returns to the key second
part of the definition of the “compilation” – the compiler’s selection,
coordination, or arrangement – it is evident that the operative provi-
sions of the definitions of “computer program,” “compilation,” and
“audiovisual work” are quite similar.  The term “set” in the definition
of “computer program” equates with the term “series” in “audiovisual
35. Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242, 245 (1992) (reviewing Copyright
Office’s decision on remand).
36. Id. (quoting Feist, 499 U.S. at 348).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “computer program”) (emphasis supplied). Al-
though it is popularly believed that this definition originated with the National Com-
mission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (“CONTU”), research for
this article reveals that it originated with testimony submitted by the Information Indus-
try Association before the House copyright subcommittee on May 15, 1975. See Copy-
right Law Revision:  Hearing on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 333 (1975).  It
was not until a year later, at a May 7, 1976 meeting of the Commission, that the identi-
cal language was presented to the Commission. See Transcript of CONTU Meeting Number
6, NTIS PB-254-765, at 122 (Dept. Commerce, May 1976).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “audiovisual work”) (emphasis supplied).
39. This does not mean original components cannot be protected, only that the
absence of protectible components does not disqualify protection for the sequence.
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work,” and with “select[ion and] . . . arrangement” in “compilation.”40
All three definitions involve a collection of material where the building
blocks may not be protectible; with compilations, the building blocks
are data or other preexisting material; with audiovisual works, the
building blocks are the individual frames; with computer programs,
the building blocks are the individual statements or instructions.  In all
three definitions, though, originality may be found in the mere se-
quencing of the building blocks: the selection, coordination, or ar-
rangement of data; the series of the images; and the set of statements
or instructions.
Thus, following Feist and Atari Games Corp., so long as there is a
“minimal degree of creativity” in the “choice and ordering” of the com-
puter program’s set of statements or instructions, the set as a whole is
entitled to protection, even though any unoriginal component parts
are not.  This approach also fits well with section 102(b).  The original
aspects of a computer program are protected according to section
102(a) and the section 101 definition, while unoriginal components
are excluded by section 102(b).  Since the existence of Section 102(b)
has caused endless troubles in computer program cases, we shall now
examine its application to them.
COMPUTER PROGRAMS AND THE IDEA-EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY
Courts were faced with the argument that only the idea and not
the expression of a work had been copied long before passage of the
1976 Copyright Act and long before computers were in existence.  Af-
ter deciding copyright cases for almost fifty years, Judge Hand, in one
of his final opinions, came to the conclusion that no general rule can
be formulated for determining what is idea and what is expression,
writing in Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp.,41  “[o]bviously,
no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond
copying the ‘idea,’ and has borrowed its ‘expression.’”42  This difficulty
should make courts particularly wary of announcing rules to be ap-
plied to classes of subject matter, including computer programs, since
broad formulations are likely to be incapable of taking into account
the wide varieties of creativity found in different types of authorship.
Judge Hand’s statement in Peter Pan Fabrics stands in contrast to
his more detailed review of the issue in Nichols v. Universal Pictures
40. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
41. 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960).
42. Id. at 489.  Chief Judge Newman noted the same difficulty in trade dress cases.
See Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 32 (2d Cir. 1995).
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Corp.,43 in which he contemplated various “patterns of generality” or
“series of abstractions” that could be used to separate idea from expres-
sion in plays.
Upon any work . . . a great number of patterns of increas-
ing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of
the incident is left out.  The last may perhaps be no more
than the most general statement of what the [work] is
about, and at times might consist only of its title; but
there is a point in this series of abstractions where they
are no longer protected, since otherwise the [author]
could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which, apart from
their expression, his property is never extended.44
Nichols assumes a unified, copyrightable work of fiction.  The issue
in Nichols was not copyrightability, but rather infringement where the
defendant did not copy text, but, allegedly, characters and plot – inte-
gral parts of a unified whole.  By contrast, in cases such as Lotus Develop-
ment Corp., the issue is copying of discrete textual elements.
Although Nimmer erroneously characterized Judge Hand’s discus-
sion in Nichols as an “abstractions test,”45 and has successfully argued its
adoption in a mutated form in computer program cases with disastrous
consequences, as Judge Easterbrook wisely observed, the abstractions
test “is not a ‘test’ at all.  It is a clever way to pose the difficulties that
require courts to avoid either extreme of the continuum of general-
ity.”46  Similarly, Judge Newman has written that “Judge Hand mani-
festly did not think of his observations as the enunciation of anything
that might be called a ‘test.”  His disclaimer (for himself and everyone
else) of the ability to ‘fix the boundary’ should have been sufficient
caution that no ‘test’ capable of yielding a result was intended.”47  Ap-
parently agreeing, Judge Keeton, citing Peter Pan Fabrics, declared in an
early case involving Lotus’s 1-2-3 spreadsheet program, “[i]t seems the
better part of wisdom, if not valor, not to press the search for a suitable
bright-line test . . . where Learned Hand, even after decades of experi-
ence in judging, found none.”48
43. 45 F.2d 119 (1930).
44. Id. at 121.
45. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[F], at 13-132 (2002).
46. Nash v. C.B.S., Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990); see CCC Info. Servs.,
Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, 44 F.3d 61, 69 n.15 (2d Cir. 1994) (following
Nash).
47. Jon O. Newman, New Lyrics for an Old Melody:  The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in
the Computer Age, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 691, 694 (1999).
48. Lotus Dev. Corp, 740 F. Supp. at 60.
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Perhaps the better part of wisdom is to acknowledge that there is
no idea-expression “test” either.  The statement that given material is
an (unprotectible) idea or (protectible) expression is merely a state-
ment of the conclusion reached, rather than a methodology for reach-
ing that conclusion.  Whether given material is idea or expression must
be made on an ad hoc basis taking into account the amount of origi-
nality involved, as well as any possible constraints on that originality.
Some of those constraints may be technological.  Because much em-
phasis has been placed in computer cases on technical constraints and
the so-called “merger doctrine” – a specialized application of the idea-
expression doctrine – it will be helpful to examine that doctrine.
THE MERGER DOCTRINE AND COMPUTER PROGRAMS
The First Circuit’s decision in Lotus Development Corp.49  notwith-
standing, the idea-expression dichotomy should rarely preclude copy-
right in an entire work. This is also true of the related doctrine known
49. 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233
(1996). Lotus Development Corp. is, though, in accord with earlier First Circuit precedent.
In Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967), the court of
appeals wrote:
When the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that “the topic
necessarily requires,” if not only one form of expression, at best only a lim-
ited number, to permit copyrighting would mean that a party or parties, by
copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities of fu-
ture use of the substance.  In such circumstances it does not seem accurate
to say that any particular form of expression comes from the subject matter.
However, it is necessary to say that the subject matter would be appropri-
ated by permitting the copyrighting of its expression.  We cannot recognize
copyright as a game of chess in which the public can be checkmated.
For other examples of courts finding entire works to constitute ideas, see Kern River Gas
Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1464 (5th Cir. 1990); Herbert Rosen-
thal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971); Prod. Contractors,
Inc. v. WGN Cont’l Broad. Co., 622 F. Supp. 1500, 1503 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (“idea of a
Christmas parade is a common one, relatively simple and containing no original crea-
tive authorship“); Arthur v. ABC, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 146, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (sketches
of five interlocking rings, in which three of the rings were modified to represent the
lower case letters a, b, and c held to be uncopyrightable as containing ”no more than
the bare idea or concept of superimposing . . . two logos,“ but sculptural work of the
five rings found protectible); see also OPINION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF N.Y. NO. 84-
F9 (1984) (on file with author), 1985-1986 COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,753, at 19,379
(ideas for how to redredge the Erie Canal or build a man-made island in New York
Harbor not copyrightable); cf. G.D. Searle & Co. v. Philips-Miller & Assocs., 836 F. Supp.
520, 524 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (rejecting argument that advertising proposal was an idea).
But see Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1992) (limiting Kern
River).  In each of these cases, the courts would have been on sounder ground finding
that the work lacked the requisite originality.
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as ”merger.“50  The merger doctrine has been explained as follows by
the Ninth Circuit:
When the “idea” and its “expression” are . . . inseparable,
copying the “expression” will not be barred, since protect-
ing the “expression” in such circumstances would confer
a monopoly of the “idea” upon the copyright owner free
of the conditions and limitations imposed by the patent
law.51
Subsequent courts have expanded the doctrine’s reach, finding it
applicable when there are also a few ways of expressing a particular
idea.52  The validity of merger as a doctrine separate from the idea-
expression dichotomy is doubtful, however.  If an idea and its alleged
expression are truly inseparable, there can be no selectivity sufficient
to satisfy the originality requirement.53  If, on the other hand, an au-
thor has choices regarding the content or design of a work and imbues
50. See Kern River, 899 F.2d at 1463 (“The doctrine of ‘merger’ developed in an
effort to deal with the difficulty in locating the precise boundary between idea and
expression.”).
51. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d at 742 (holding that a jeweled bee pin was a noncopyright-
able idea). Cf. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Honora Jewelry Co., 509 F.2d 64 (2d
Cir. 1974) (no infringement of jeweled turtle pins); But cf. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry
Corp. v. Grossbardt, 436 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1970) (same work from Kalpakian found to
be infringed by verbatim copy); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Zale Corp., 323 F.
Supp. 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (jeweled bee and turtle pins protectible).
52. See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd, 9 F.3d 823, 838 (10th Cir.
1993); M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 436 (1986) ; Whelan Assocs., Inc.
v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 n.30 (1986); Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (1983) (“If the same idea can be ex-
pressed in a plurality of totally different manners, a plurality of copyrights may result
. . . . ” Merger occurs when “there are no or few other ways of expressing a particular
idea.”) (quoting Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 691 (2d Cir. 1926)).
In Paperback, the court stated:
If . . . the expression of an idea has elements that go beyond all functional
elements of the idea itself, and beyond the obvious, and if there are numer-
ous other ways of expressing the non-copyrightable idea, then those ele-
ments of expression, if original and substantial, are copyrightable.
740 F. Supp. at 59.
This statement is awash with confusion between the copyright and patent laws (requir-
ing that the expression be “beyond the obvious”), id., and seemingly requires that a
higher standard for copyright protection be met than that set forth by the Supreme
Court in Feist.
53. See Synercom Tech., Inc. v. Univ. Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1012
(N.D. Tex. 1978) (“One can argue that inseparability of idea and expression is here an
antinomy.  The argument asks if the idea and the usage are not separable, what is the
expression?”).
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the work with more than a minimal amount of expression,54 the court
should not focus on copyrightability, but instead on the scope of pro-
tection.  Thus, the better approach, that of the District of Columbia55
and Second Circuit,56 is that merger is relevant at the infringement
stage as a limiting principle on the scope rather than on the existence
of protection.  When used at the infringement stage, merger can be
applied sensitively to the facts before the court, permitting the court to
ensure that the proper balance between protection and competition is
preserved.57  A work with minimal originality (a “thin” copyright in
Feist’s lexicon)58 may be protected only against verbatim or near verba-
tim copying – nevertheless important protection – while the creation
of original works that genuinely build on the earlier, “thin” copy-
righted work will not be impeded.  Thus used, merger and other doc-
trines such as the fair use privilege, can be important, almost surgical
tools to strike the appropriate balance in individual cases.
By contrast, when merger is used at the copyrightability stage, if
too much protection is granted in one case, it will be difficult for later
courts (at least in the same circuit) to cut back on the protection for a
given work; even though in a later case the facts may warrant permit-
ting a subsequent programmer greater leeway in copying.  Conversely,
when merger is used to deny protection altogether, later courts lose
their ability to prevent verbatim copying by freeloaders.  Unfortu-
nately, in computer program cases some courts have elevated merger
to be the principal criterion by which copyrightability is to be deter-
mined, rather than focusing on the statutory scheme Congress pro-
vided.  Oddly, this elevation is also the result of a misinterpretation of a
nineteenth century case, Baker v. Selden59, decided ninety-six years
before section 102(b) became part of the Copyright Act.
54. The mere fact that there are choices does not automatically mean that the
choice made possesses originality.
55. E.g., Atari Games Corp., 888 F.2d at 884-86 (scenes a faire).
56. E.g., Kregos v. The Associated Press & Sports Features Syndicate, Inc., 937 F.2d
700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991); Cont’l Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958).
57. As Chief Judge Newman noted:
Determining when the idea and its expression have merged is a task requir-
ing considerable care:  if the merger doctrine is applied too readily, argua-
bly available alternative forms of expression will be precluded; if applied
too sparingly, protection will be accorded to ideas.
Kregos, 937 F.2d at 705.
58. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 349.
59. 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
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BAKER V. SELDEN AND COMPUTER PROGRAMS
The origin of the idea-expression dichotomy is frequently traced
to the Supreme Court’s 1880 decision in Baker v. Selden.60  It is ques-
tionable whether the origin is correctly ascribed: the opinion never
refers to ideas and was decided on the ground of lack of originality.
Plaintiff Selden had developed a system of double-entry bookkeeping,
which he described through explanatory text and forms and published
in a book for which he received a copyright registration.  Defendant
Baker wrote a book employing a similar system of bookkeeping, but,
critically, used substantially different forms.  While certain columns
were identical in both parties’ works, the defendant claimed these col-
umns did not originate with the plaintiff and were, moreover, required
by state law.61  Even though there was no appropriation of either the
explanatory text or the forms, Selden claimed that the copyright in his
book gave him the exclusive right to use the double-entry system of
bookkeeping despite the lack of substantial similarity between the par-
ties’ forms.62  The Supreme Court rejected Selden’s claim of owner-
ship of rights in his system, writing, “the mere copyright of Selden’s
book did not confer upon him the exclusive right to make and use
account-books, ruled and arranged as designated by him and de-
scribed and illustrated in said book.”63  The Court’s reasoning is re-
vealed in an earlier passage:
To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in
the art described therein, when no examination of its nov-
elty has ever been officially made, would be a surprise and
60. Id.
61. Compare Brief for Appellant at 10-13, Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880), with
Brief for Appellee at 9, Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
62. See Brief for Appellee at 6-7, Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880). The appellee
argued:
[r]uled lines and headings in the abstract may be open to the common use
of all in bookkeeping – but when they are so arranged as to bespeak by
classification and condensation a new method of keeping accounts, they,
too, are protected, because they then become something more than mere
ruled lines and headings in the abstract, and convey useful knowledge in
the concrete . . . .  The appellee claims that these copyrights extend to and
embrace a system of bookkeeping – a combination of lines as arranged as
to suggest an improved method of classifying and condensing mercantile
accounts.  The lines are the symbols to convey the idea of the method or
plan.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
63. Baker, 101 U.S. at 107; see also Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 676 (1878).
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a fraud upon the public.  That is the province of letters-
patent, not of copyright.64
In short, Selden was attempting to gain patent protection for his sys-
tem through a copyright in a book, an effort the Court rightly rejected.
Then, in dictum that has become (in)famous as the “use versus expla-
nation” dichotomy, the Court added:
The very object of publishing a book on science or the
useful arts is to communicate to the world the useful
knowledge which it contains.  But this object would be
frustrated if the knowledge could not be used without in-
curring the guilt of piracy of the book.  And where the art
it teaches cannot be used without employing the methods
and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are
similar to them, such methods and diagrams are to be
considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given
therewith to the public; not given for the purpose of pub-
lication in other works explanatory of the art, but for the
purpose of practical application.65
64. Baker, 101 U.S. at 102. Claims for patent protection by others did not, how-
ever, fare any better. See Munson v. Mayor of New York, 124 U.S. 601, 601 (1888) (find-
ing invalid a patent for “new and useful improvements in preserving, filing and
canceling bonds, coupons, certificates of stock, etc.,” consisting of blank books).  Other
cases denying copyright in systems or plans include Crume v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
140 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1944); Taylor Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98
(7th Cir. 1943); Brief English Sys., Inc. v. Owen, 48 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1931); Stone &
McCarrick, Inc. v. Dugan Piano Co., 220 F. 837 (5th Cir. 1915) (manual on how to
create advertisements did not prohibit piano company from using illustrations con-
tained therein to create an advertisement); Amberg File & Index Co. v. Shea Smith &
Co., 82 F. 314 (7th Cir. 1897) (index books held noncopyrightable); Drugtax, Inc. v.
Sys. Programming Corp., 147 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 313, 315 (M.D. Pa. 1965) (While defen-
dant copied “in considerable detail” plaintiff’s idea, plan, and method for enabling
pharmacists to supply their customers with information on the deductibility of their
drugs, the court held that “this . . . is not the test in determining infringement of a
copyright.”); Gaye v. Gillis, 167 F. Supp. 416 (D. Mass. 1958) (coupon book); Aldrich v.
Remington Rand, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Tex. 1942); Burk v. Relief & Burial Assoc.,
3 Haw. 388 (D. Haw. 1909); Burnell v. Chown, 69 F. 993 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1895) (credit
ratings); Griggs v. Perrin, 49 F. 15 (C.C. N.D.N.Y. 1892).  An interesting (but neverthe-
less unsuccessful) attempt to circumvent the lack of copyright in systems was made in
Seltzer v. Sunbrock, 22 F. Supp. 621, 627 (S.D. Cal. 1938), in which the court rejected
plaintiff’s claim that a description in its pamphlet of a system for conducting roller
skating races was a “dramatic composition.” See Seltzer v. Corem, 26 F. Supp. 892 (N.D.
Ind. 1939).
65. Baker, 101 U.S. at 103.
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This statement is dictum for two reasons:  first, under the facts of
Baker, the defendant Baker’s work was not substantially similar to plain-
tiff Selden’s; Baker could use the knowledge contained in Selden’s
book “without incurring the guilt of piracy” and did so without copying
Selden’s forms.  In other words, Baker did practice the art contained
in Selden’s book without using Selden’s “methods and diagrams.”  The
centerpiece of the suit was Selden’s claim that he owned a copyright in
the bookkeeping system notwithstanding the lack of substantial similar-
ity in the forms – the illustrated “methods and diagrams.”66  If there
had been substantial similarity between the parties’ forms, the case
would have been a run-of-the-mill infringement suit.
The second and perhaps more important reason the “use versus
explanation” statement is dictum is that the Court decided the case on
an entirely different ground.  The holding as announced by the Court
was:  “blank account-books are not the subject of copyright.”67  The
Court’s conclusion was thus that Selden’s forms lacked originality, not
that they contained expression which was merged with his bookkeep-
ing system, as the lower courts’ computer program opinions mistakenly
assert.68  Instead, there was no original expression to begin with.  The
holding announced by the Court – that there is no originality in blank
forms – spawned a rich history of cases and Copyright Office regula-
tions involving such forms, the upshot of which is a conclusion that the
Baker v. Selden “blank form rule” is nothing more than an application
of the originality requirement.  Those forms that possess the requisite
“modicum of creativity” have been protected.69
66. The Supreme Court appears to have subsequently interpreted Baker v. Selden
as standing for nothing more than a case where there was no substantial similarity and
the claim was in the system notwithstanding the lack of similarity. See Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (“In Baker v. Selden, the Court held that a copyrighted book
on a peculiar system of bookkeeping was not infringed by a similar book using a similar
plan which achieved similar results where the alleged infringer made a different ar-
rangement of the columns and used different headings.” (citation omitted)).
67. Baker, 101 U.S. at 107.
68. See Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 704-05 (2d Cir.
1992); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 817 (1st Cir. 1995). The facts
in Baker v. Selden – Baker’s ability to illustrate Selden’s system using nonsubstantially
similar forms – demonstrate that there was no merger.
69. Id. at 332; see Kregos, 937 F.2d at 708-09 (2d Cir. 1991).  Application of the
“blank form” originality “rule” to computer works has been inconsistent.  The first case
to do so, Synercom Tech., Inc. v. Univ. Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Texas
1978), arose under the 1909 Copyright Act and involved complex facts.  Data was con-
tained in copyrighted manuals.  This data was then manually written down on “input
format” cards, which had the appearance of an 80-column punched card.  Once the
data was transferred to the input format cards, the data was given to operators who
created punch cards containing the data in a form executable by a computer.  Each
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Baker v. Selden, when understood according to its facts and the
holding announced by the Court, stands for the unremarkable conclu-
sion that Selden’s forms lacked the requisite originality.  Since the
forms were unprotected and Selden had not received a patent, he had
no right to control their use.  Accordingly, deification of Baker v. Selden
in late twentieth century computer program cases is unjustified.
Whatever the merits of Baker’s dictum on use,70 we now are con-
struing a statute, a statute that extends protection to computer pro-
grams that “bring about a certain result.”  One can sympathize with the
input format was individually registered with the Copyright Office.  Defendant did not
copy the computer program code, but it did copy information from the manuals, and
plaintiff alleged it also copied the input formats.  Then-District Judge Higginbotham
found the input formats conveyed information, but that the information was merged
with the “idea” of the work. The continuing precedential value of Syndercom is open to
question, however, since in a recent case involving the same parties and many of the
same input formats (but in a reverse posture as parties), the Fifth Circuit upheld a
claim of copyrightability and infringement in the formats as a compilation. See Eg’g
Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335 (5th Cir. 1994).  In the process,
the Fifth Circuit pointedly disavowed the argument that it had endorsed Synercom in its
opinion in Plains Cotton Coop. Ass’n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d
1256 (5th Cir. 1987). See Eng’g Dynamics, Inc., 26 F.d at 1341-42.
Other cases have confronted the blank form rule in connection with computer
program elements. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc., 797 F.2d at 1242-43 (protection for file
structures); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1040 (N.D.
Cal. 1992) (gray background for comptuer terminal display found to be an “unpro-
tectible blank form”), aff’d, 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176
(1995); CMAX/Cleveland, Inc. v. UCR, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 337, 355 (M.D. Ga. 1992)
(file structures found not to be blank forms); Digital Communications Assoc., Inc. v.
Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 460-62 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (finding status
screen display was not a blank form).
70. Cf. Digital Communications Assocs., 659 F. Supp. at 449, which involved a “status
screen” display.  A status screen display contains an arrangement of command terms
under various headings.  Defendant argued that because the entire status screen was
“used” as part of the operation of the computer program, protection was prohibited by
Baker v. Selden.  The court rejected the argument, writing:
The defendants read into Baker v. Seldin [sic] a distinction between works to
“be used” and works to “explain.”  As noted in Mazer v. Stein, “nothing in
the copyright statute [supports] the argument that the intended use or use
in industry of an article eligible for copyright bars or invalidates its registra-
tion.  We do not read such a limitation into the copyright law.”  A work can
be used and can explain; that part of the work which explains, if not neces-
sary to the idea of the work, is copyrightable.
Id. at 459 (quoting Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218) (citations omitted).
Unfortunately, Judge O’Kelley didn’t go far enough; there is also no bar to protecting a
work in the form in which it is being used so long as it contains expression.  Indeed,
under Judge O’Kelley’s view, no operating system program could be protected because
an operating system is only “used”; it does not interact with the consumer.
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difficulties that statute causes, but the statute is, no doubt, here to stay.
Efforts to avoid granting protection for ideas, methods of operation, or
processes are understandable, but when those efforts involve distortion
of basic copyright principles, damage to other subject matter, far afield
from computer programs, is inevitable.  The approach suggested here
– construe the statutory definition of “computer program” – seeks
both to give meaning to the language Congress chose and to avoid
such undesirable collateral damage.
Judge Newman cautioned against that result in his plea to use a
different vocabulary for computer programs than for literary works:
“Words convey concepts, and if we use identical phrases from one con-
text to resolve issues in another, we risk failing to notice that the rele-
vant concepts are and ought to be somewhat different.”71  While the
concept of protecting computer programs under copyright is strained
at best, using the statutory words Congress employed and the vocabu-
lary of computer science can at least alleviate some of the ill-fit.
71. Jon O. Newman, New Lyrics for an Old Melody:  The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in
the Computer Age, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 691, 695 (1999).
